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Liability of Vendor of Real Property
For Personal Injuries
The author of this Note discusses the liability of the vendor
of real property to the vendee or third persons injured on
the premises after the sale has been completed. He con-
cludes that the vendor should not be liable unless he has
concealed the defect causing the injury, or unless he is also
the builder and the defect causing the injury resulted from
his negligence.
THE general rule in the United States and England is that
a vendor of real property, after parting with title and possession, is
not liable for subsequent injuries to his vendee or third persons
caused by dangerous conditions existing on the property at the time
of sale.' This rule has undergone few changes since it was stated in
Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co.2 sixty years ago. The purpose of
this Note is to examine the application of and exceptions to the
general rule and to analyze the soundness of that rule when applied
to builder-vendors.
I. APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL RuLE
Since its inception, the general rule has been applied to actions
involving injuries on all types of real property, regardless of whether
the vendor created the dangerous condition or merely allowed it to
arise through disrepair. In applying the general rule, the courts have
set forth alternative lines of reasoning, depending on whether the
injured plaintiff is the vendee or a third person.- When the vendee
1. See 2 HAR'an & JA2Mxs, TORTS 1518 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 462 (2d ed.
1955); RESTATEMEr, TORTS § 852 (1934).
2. 182 Pa. 82, 37 Ad. 995 (1897). In Palmore, the plaintiff, injured by a defective
gate while standing upon a public sidewalk adjacent to the property, was denied
recovery from a vendor who had sold the property the previous day. This case,
although involving an injury to one outside the premises, is the foundation case for
most decisions involving injuries to persons upon the premises.
3. Injured persons attempting to recover from the vendor have advanced the
following theories of action: negligence, nuisance, implied warranty, and analogy to
landlord-tenant cases. Most actions by injured vendees or third persons have been
based upon the vendor's negligence in creating the dangerous condition or allowing
it to arise through disrepair. This theory has been rejected by the courts except
where liability of the vendee is deferred until he has had time to inspect and make
repairs (see text accompanying notes 11 and 12 infra) or where the concealment
exception has been applied (see text accompanying notes 14 through 17 infra). See
cases cited notes 4 and 7 infra.
Recovery on the nuisance theory has been allowed by the New York courts under
the Multiple Dwelling Law of that state. These courts have interpreted that law
as expanding the theory of nuisance to include disrepair of a multiple dwelling, and
have allowed recovery from the vendor by applying the common law doctrine that
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is injured, the theory underlying denial of recovery appears to be
that the vendee should have inspected the premises before sale and
rejected them if their condition was unsatisfactory.4 Having had this
opportunity to inspect, the vendee is presumed to have accepted the
condition of the property at the time of sale. This approach is
strongly stated in the English case of Otto v. Bolton & Norris,' in
which the vendee's mother was injured by falling plaster from an
obviously defective ceiling. The court denied the plaintiff recovery
in her suit based on the vendor's negligent construction, and said:
A purchaser can make any examination he likes, either by himself or by
somebody better qualified so to do. He can take it or leave it, but if he
takes it, he takes it as he finds it. It is, perhaps, the strongest example of
the application of the maxim, "caveat emptor." 6
Where a third person is injured, recovery is denied on the theory
that the duty to maintain the property, being one of ownership and
possession, terminates when the property is sold because the vendor
has neither control over, nor the right to repair the premises. 7 For
example, in Copfer v. Golden s the child-plaintiff was attracted to
the creator of a nuisance does not rid himself of liability by conveying the property
to another. N.Y. MuLT. DwELL. LAw §§ 78, 309. Under this theory the vendor's
liability extends until "the new owner has had reasonable opportunity to discover
the condition on prompt inspection and to make necessary repairs." Pharm v. Lituchy,
283 N.Y. 130, 132, 27 N.E.2d 811, 812 (1940). For a discussion of the New York
law, see 2 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 148 (1940).
New York has not allowed recovery on the nuisance theory where a multiple
dwelling is not involved. See Antonsen v. Bay Ridge Say. Bank, 266 App. Div. 164,
41 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (per curiam). Accord, McQuillan v. Clark Thread
Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 409, 172 AtL. 870 (Sup. Ct. 1934); McIntosh v. Goodwin, 40
Tenn. App. 505, 292 S.W.2d 242 (1954). But see Bray v. Cross, 98 Ga. App. 612,
106 S.E.2d 315 (1958).
The theory of implied warranty has been rejected on the ground that warranties
are not implied in the sale of real estate. Combow v. Ground Inv. Co., 858 Mo. 984,
218 S.W.2d 589 (1949); Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1986] 2 K.B. 46; 4 WIUsToN,
CoNTRAcTs § 926 (rev. ed. 1986).
An analogy to the landlord-tenant cases has been rejected on the ground that the
two relationships differ substantially. Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 847, 270 S.W. 66
(1924). In any event, this theory would be unavailing in most jurisdictions since
recovery against the landlord is denied. See 2 HAnPER & JAmms, TORTS 1509 (1956).
4. Cases involving injured vendees: Stone v. Heyman Bros., 124 Cal. App. 46,
12 P.2d 126 (1st App. Dist. 1982); Kordig v. Grovedale Oleander Homes, Inc., 18
IMl. App. 2d 48, 151 N.E.2d 470 (1958); Mercer v. Meinel, 214 Ill. App. 582 (1919);
Combow v. Ground Inv. Co., 858 Mo. 984, 218 S.W.2d 589 (1949); Smith v. Tucker,
151 Tenn. 847, 270 S.W. 66 (1924); McIntosh v. Goodwin, 40 Tenn. App. 505, 292
S.W.2d 242 (1954); Ropeke v. Palmer, 6 Tenn. App. 848 (1927); Otto v. Bolton &
Norris, [1986] 2 K.B. 46; Bottomley v. Bannister, [1982] 1 K.B. 458.
5. [1986] 2 K.B. 46. For a criticism of this case, see 52 L.Q. R!v. 318 (1986).
6. Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1986] 2 K.B. 46, 52.
7. Cases involving injured third persons: Copfer v. Golden, 185 Cal. App. 2d 628,
288 P.2d 90 (2d App. Dist. 1955); Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 180 N.W. 409
(1911) (third party's horse killed on premises); McQuillan v. Clark Thread Co., 12
N.J. Misc. 409, 172 AU. 870 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Slavitz v. Morris Park Estates, 98
Misc. 814, 162 N.Y. Supp. 888 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (decided on the nuisance theory);
Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 182 Pa. 82, 87 At. 995 (1897).
8. 185 Cal. App. 2d 628, 288 P.2d 90 (1955).
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the premises by various objects placed there, and was injured while
playing on a stripped-down trailer. After finding the owner liable for
an attractive nuisance, the court released the vendor who had con-
veyed the property seven months earlier, saying:
After the owner of property has disposed of it he is no longer liable for
what may happen thereon for the reason that he is in no position to control
the use thereof and his duty to children of tender years who come thereon
is at an end. .... By the conveyances, defendants . . . divested them-
selves of title and all right to possession and of reentry for any purpose;
all duties of ownership as to them were at an end.9
In most instances, the reasoning supporting the application of the
general rule is sound. Once the property has left the possession and
control of the vendor, he can neither enter upon the land to make
repairs, nor can he require the vendee to make them. He cannot
control the manner in which the premises are used or protect the
people who use them. Furthermore, to protect his own interests the
vendee should inspect the property he is buying; as a practical
matter, sales of real estate are not concluded until the vendee or his
agent has made an examination to discover its true condition. If he
conducts a reasonable inspection, the vendee can discover patent
defects and may reject the property or insist upon repair. Therefore,
he should be bound by his inspection with respect to defects which
could have been discovered.
This reasoning, of course, is unsatisfactory when a dangerous
condition is latent. In that situation, the vendee is unlikely to dis-
cover the condition upon his pre-sale inspection, and, therefore, will
be unaware of the need to repair when the property is in his exclu-
sive control. An occupier of land is not liable for injuries caused by
defects not known or reasonably discoverable by him. 1 Therefore,
where the vendor and the vendee have no knowledge of the latent
defect, neither would be liable to an injured third person. The ven-
dee, when buying previously occupied property, must assume that
some physical deterioration has occurred, a fact normally reflected
in the purchase price. Therefore, an injured vendee should not be
allowed to look to the vendor for indemnification for injuries re-
sulting from a dangerous condition not within the vendor's knowl-
edge. Furthermore, a contrary result would require the vendor to
insure against injuries long after his interest in the property ceases.
II. TimE LLABILrrY SHFrs
In applying the general rule, the courts do not agree upon the
time when responsibility for injuries to third persons shifts from the
9. Id. at 688, 634, 288 P.2d at 96, 97.
10. See PaossFR, ToRTs § 78 (2d ed. 1955) and cases cited fa. 58, at 459.
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vendor to the vendee. In Palmore, where a third party was injured
the day after the property was sold, the court held the vendor not
liable, and stated by way of dictum that the vendee's liability at-
tached at the time of the sale.1 However, other courts have indi-
cated that the vendee is not liable for injuries to persons on the
premises until he has had both notice of and an opportunity to
repair the dangerous condition.' Since it would be unjust to deny
the third person recovery, courts adopting the latter view must, in
fairness, hold the vendor liable until the vendee's liability attaches.
Releasing the vendor from liability at the time of sale seems to be
the better solution. First, in nearly all cases the vendee has sufficient
time to make a close inspection of the property before concluding
the sale. Second, present practice is to insure only during the period
of possession, making satisfaction of the judgment more likely from
the vendee, who is in possession, than from the vendor.'3 Third,
the vendee, who owns the property on which the injury occurs, is
more likely to be within the jurisdiction and available for suit, while
the vendor may have left the state. Finally, the property itself may
serve as security for a judgment. Therefore, there seems to be no
reason for deferring the vendee's liability beyond the time of sale.
III. THE CONCEALmT EXCEPTON
When the vendor has knowledge of a latent condition, most courts
apply an exception to the general rule. This exception, referred to as
the "concealment" or "Restatement" exception, provides:
A vendor of land, who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any con-
dlition whether natural or artificial involving unreasonable risk to persons
upon the land, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to the
vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his
subvendee, after the vendee has taken possession, if (a) the vendee does
not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and (b) the vendor
knows of the condition and the risk involved therein and has reason to
believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.14
Under this exception, the vendor remains liable whether he
actively conceals the dangerous condition, such as by painting over
it, or simply fails to disclose its existence. He must, however, have
11. 182 Pa. 82, 89, 37 Adt. 995, 999 (1897). "[From the moment . . . [the
vendee] took possession under his deed, the duties theretofore incumbent on . . .[the vendor] were transferred to him, and he became answerable to the public for
neglect in their performance."
12. See Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (1940); Ahem v. Steele,
115 N.Y. 203, 22 N.E. 193 (1889) (dictum) (action against heir); Pavelchak v.
Finn, 153 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum). See also Sabiston's Adm'r v.
Otis Elevator Co., 251 Ky. 222, 64 S.W.2d 588 (1933) (action against receiver),
where the court said that the defendant must at least have knowledge of the
dangerous condition before his liability attaches.
13. See 2 HARPER & JAm.s, TORTS 1520 (1956).
14. RESTATEmENT, ToRTS § 353 (1934).
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actual knowledge of the condition and realize that an unreasonable
risk is involved to those unaware of it.'5
The concealment doctrine first appeared in dictum in the early
Palmore case.'6 The rationale underlying the doctrine is that al-
though the vendee should inspect the premises to discover danger-
ous conditions, the vendor has prevented discovery by his conscious
concealment; therefore, he should remain liable for injuries occur-
ring after the property has been sold.' Although the courts of Eng-
land 1 and Tennessee 19 have indicated that the vendor is under no
duty to disclose dangerous conditions to his vendee, most courts
considering the issue have accepted the concealment doctrine. 20
The soundness of the concealment doctrine is obvious. If the
vendor is not held liable for injuries from concealed defects, he will
be encouraged to prevent discovery of dangerous conditions in order
to enhance the value of his property. The fact that the vendor may
be forced to lower his price or bear the expense of repair if dis-
closure is required, is not an undue burden when compared with the
burden of serious injuries to the vendee or third persons which
could result.
The vendor remains liable under the concealment doctrine "until
the vendee has discovered the true condition and not merely until
he could do so by a proper inspection." 2' Extending the vendor's
liability until actual discovery is proper, since the vendee is unlikely
to make a further investigation of an object apparently safe.
IV. LLABmrn= OF BuIDER-VEND R
Until recently, the courts in applying the general rule did not
15. See RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 353, comment c (1934).
16. 182 Pa. 82, 90, 37 Atl. 995, 999 (1897). "And while laying down this rule
in this case, we do not intend to be understood as declaring there can be no
exception to it. There may be a case where the grantor conceals from the grantee
a defect in a structure known to him alone, and not discoverable by caeful inspection,
that the owner would be held liable, though out of possession ...
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 853, comment c (1934).
18. See Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1936] 2 K.B. 46; Bottomley v. Bannister, [19321
1 K.B. 458.
19. See Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1924) (dictum); McIn-
tosh v. Goodwin, 40 Tenn. App. 505, 292 S.W.2d 242 (1954); Ropeke v. Palmer, 6
Tenn. App. 348 (1927). For a critical evaluation of the Tennessee courts' refusal
to allow recovery for injuries caused by concealed defects, see 24 TENN. L. REv.
1170 (1957).
20. United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953); Caporaletti v. A-F
Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd per curiam on other groun&, 240 F.2d
53 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Derby v. Public Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955);
McCabe v. Cohen, 294 N.Y. 522, 63 N.E.2d 88 (1945) (per curiam); Kilmer v.
White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930); Pavelchak v. Finn, 153 N.Y.S.2d 795
(Sup. Ct. 1956); Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co., 182 Pa. 82, 37 Atl. 995 (1897)
(dictum).
21. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 353, comment c (1934). See Pavelchak v. Finn, 153
N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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distinguish between the liability of a builder-vendor -22 and the ven-
dor of previously occupied property. However, such a distinction
was drawn in Caporaletti v. A-F Corp.,23 where the builder-vendor
was held liable to his vendee for an injury resulting from a latent
defect. In that case the vendee had purchased a tract24 home and
was injured by a wooden step improperly attached to its concrete
base. The court, after recognizing that conditions in the building
industry have changed since the general rule was formulated, ex-
tended the liability of a builder-vendor by saying:
[Tihis court will adopt and apply the principle that a builder who de-
fectively constructs a house, is liable to the purchaser or any other invitee,
for personal injuries sustained by the latter, if the defect could not have
been discovered on inspection by the ordinary man in the street. In this
case the builder must be charged with knowledge of his own negligence.25
Thus, the court held that a builder-vendor is liable even when he
has only constructive knowledge of a latent defect.28
The reasoning of the court in Caporaletti is especially compelling
today, since many new homes constructed for sale are built as part
of housing developments by large scale builders and contractors.
The builder-vendor should be held liable for injuries to the vendee
or third parties caused by latent defects resulting from his negli-
gence. The builder holds himself out as a specialist in house con-
struction with the technical knowledge necessary to produce sound
buildings. He has the opportunity to inspect the building as con-
struction progresses and can determine the quality of the workman-
ship and materials used.
The vendee, on the other hand, usually does not have the same
opportunity to inspect as the house is erected, since most tract
homes are completed before they are offered for sale. Even if he can
make such inspection, however, the typical vendee does not pos-
sess the technical knowledge to determine the quality of the con-
struction. Furthermore, the builder-vendor is usually in a better
financial position to insure against and absorb a substantial loss
resulting from an injury to a vendee or third party.
In summary, the rule of law adopted in Caporaletti appears to be
a desirable development in the liability of owners and occupiers of
22. For purposes of this Note, the term "builder-vendor" includes only those who
construct houses for immediate sale. The term does not include one who hires a
contractor to build a house for his own occupation and subsequently conveys the
premises.
23. 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 240 F.2d
53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
24. For purposes of this Note, the term "tract home" is a home built by a large
scale builder as part of a housing development.
25. 137 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
26. Where a defect is patent, the builder-vendor should be relieved from liability
since the vendee should discover the condition on reasonable inspection. See Kordig
v. Grovedale Oleander Homes, Inc., 18 IIl. App. 2d 48, 151 N.E.2d 470 (1958).
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real property. The general rule and the concealment exception,
however, seem to give the best result when a builder-vendor is not
involved.
